Overconfidence and Diversification

Yuval Heller

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 1, 134-53

Abstract: Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the accuracy of their private information. In this paper, we show that risk-averse principals might prefer overconfident agents in various strategic interactions because these agents help diversify the aggregate risk. This may help understanding why successful analysts and entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident. In addition, a different interpretation of the model presents a novel evolutionary foundation for overconfidence, and explains various stylized facts about this bias.

JEL-codes: D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.134
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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