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Is There Too Little Antitrust Enforcement in the US Hospital Sector?

Zarek Brot, Zack Cooper, Stuart V. Craig and Lev Klarnet

American Economic Review: Insights, 2024, vol. 6, issue 4, 526-42

Abstract: From 2002 to 2020, there were over 1,000 mergers of US hospitals. During this period, the FTC took enforcement actions against 13 transactions. However, using the FTC's standard screening tools, we find that 20 percent of these mergers could have been predicted to meaningfully lessen competition. We show that, from 2010 to 2015, predictably anticompetitive mergers resulted in price increases over 5 percent. We estimate that approximately half of predictably anticompetitive mergers had to be reported to the FTC per the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act. We conclude that there appears to be underenforcement of antitrust laws in the hospital sector.

JEL-codes: G34 G38 I11 K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20230340

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