Designing Simple Mechanisms

Shengwu Li

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2024, vol. 38, issue 4, 175-92

Abstract: It matters whether real-world mechanisms are simple. If participants cannot see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible, they may refuse to participate or may behave in ways that undermine the mechanism. There are several ways to formalize what it means for a mechanism to be "simple." This essay explains three of them, and suggests directions for future research.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Designing Simple Mechanisms (2024)
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DOI: 10.1257/jep.38.4.175

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