Substitutes for Success? Public versus Private Competition in Medicare Advantage

Tim Layton, Luca Maini and J. Michael McWilliams

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2026, vol. 40, issue 2, 143-70

Abstract: We assess the evolving role of competition in Medicare Advantage and its implications for beneficiary welfare. We describe how competition from the public option, traditional Medicare, and other private insurers within Medicare Advantage act as substitutes in incentivizing plans to deliver value. We show that while historically the choice between traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage provided a vital competitive dynamic, traditional Medicare's strength as a competitor has declined significantly, driven by generous payments favoring private plans. Consequently, the burden of ensuring value for enrollees has shifted to competition within the Medicare Advantage market. While county-level competition among private insurers has increased, this growth is primarily driven by the expansion of large national carriers rather than new entrants. Insurers still wield substantial market power due to significant barriers to entry, raising concerns about the ability of the program to incentivize private insurers to use public dollars to maximize value for beneficiaries.

JEL-codes: G22 I11 I12 I13 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1257/jep.20251469

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