Competition Law Enforcement in Dynamic Markets: Proposing a Flexible Trade-off between Fines and Behavioural Injunctions

Patrice Bougette, Frédéric Marty and Simone Vannuccini
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Simone Vannuccini: Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France

No 25-06, Working Papers AFED from Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED)

Abstract: In abuses of dominance cases, competition authorities typically impose both pecuniary sanctions and behavioural injunctions. These instruments serve distinct but complementary functions: fines primarily deter anti-competitive behaviour; injunctions seek to restore conditions conducive to competition on the merits. Yet, the effectiveness of such behavioural remedies remains contested. They often entail long-term obligations and are vulnerable to strategic circumvention or to uncertainties inherent in competitive and technological dynamics. In this paper, focusing on the European Union (EU)'s context, we propose a two-tiered sanctioning framework that addresses the drawbacks of behavioural injuctions: an initial fine, payable immediately, and a conditional component whose imposition - both in terms of activation and magnitude - would depend on the observed implementation and effects of the behavioural obligations. This structure aims to enhance both the flexibility and credibility of remedies, while preserving deterrence.

Keywords: Abuses of dominant position; fines; behavioural injunctions; market dynamics; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2025-07
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