Mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium. An experimental comparison using RPS games

Alexandru Volacu
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Alexandru Volacu: National School of Political and Administrative Studies Bucharest, Romania

Theoretical and Applied Economics, 2014, vol. XXI, issue 10(599), 89-118

Abstract: In this paper I test the hypothesis according to which the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) solution concept significantly outperforms the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) in experimental situations. The testing ground for the hypothesis is an experiment with variations of the RPS game applied in June 2013 to students from various universities in Bucharest. The results of the experiment show that the QRE solution does not perform substantially better than the Nash Equilibrium for two of the three games studied and that it does represent a slight improvement in only one of the games. This result lies in stark contrast to the bulk of the literature developed thusfar on the QRE solution.

Keywords: experiment; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; Quantal Response Eqilibrium; strategies; solution concept. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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