FISHERY MANAGEMENT IN A HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY: WILL INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS SYSTEM WORK?

Hirotsugu Uchida

No 22243, 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Individual transferable quotas system is widely regarded as the best fishery management regime. The literature, however, has ignored the consequence of this managerial system under the existence of market imperfection. This article analyzes the behavior of fishing households based on the household model when individual transferable quota system is introduced under missing labor market. It is shown that the individual transferable quotas system could adversely redistribute the quotas through quotas trade and thus cause social inefficiency.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea03:22243

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.22243

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