A UNANIMOUS CONSENT SOLUTION TO THE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS: Getting PPI Rules from a PI Process

Michael C. Farmer

No 271197, 1991 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Manhattan, Kansas from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: I model a cooperative bargain for the supply of non-rival goods. The model departs from cooperative games generally by accepting a second best framework and core reducing behavior by the implementation. problem. The solution admits the Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical consent efficiency rules as decision rules to a unanimous consent game.

Keywords: Public Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 1991-08-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea91:271197

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271197

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