WELFARE IMPROVING COLLUSION IN THE JAPANESE PORK IMPORT MARKET

Jacinto F. Fabiosa

No 21661, 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Underlying parameter estimates suggest that reduction in pork exporters' profit is three times higher when the Japanese GATT safeguard is invoked, providing incentive to foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the trigger. This collusion is welfare-improving since the safeguard induces more inefficiencies. Workable and efficient allocation rules are constructed with a multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade of quota.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea99:21661

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21661

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