Would Enterprises Send Food Traceability Information to Consumers?

Wu Tianzhen, Wang Ruimei, Hu Hongwei and Song Huan

Journal of Food Research, 2014, vol. 4, issue 1

Abstract: Food security incidents have enhanced Chinese consumers’ concerns about food quality and security. These growing concerns have increased demand for security of food and led to development of Chinese food traceability system. Based on the literature review, this paper built a signaling dynamic game model of information delivery from enterprises to consumers to explore the refining Bayes Nash equilibrium. The analytical results show that “good” enterprise need to send enough food traceability information to get themselves separated from “bad” enterprises, while enterprises which were “not that good” had to send much more information to achieve that trust of consumers.

Keywords: Supply; Chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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