TENURE ARRANGEMENTS AND ACCESS TO CREDIT:THE CASE OF SMALL-SCALE FARMERS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE

F. D. K. Anim and H. D. van Schalkwyk

Agrekon, 1996, vol. 35, issue 4

Abstract: It has been argued that indigenous land tenure arrangements influence individual incentives to invest in improvements (like watering points) and the ability to finance such investment through access to credit. In this study, data from small-scale livestock owners in the Northern Province are analyzed. The results indicate that those stockowners who operate on communal grazing with restrictions on the use of the common resource, earn more net farm income and invest in watering points. They are also more likely to have access to credit as compared with those stockowners who operate on open access with no restrictions on the use of the commons. The results have some positive implications for the formation of group schemes to manage livestock production in communal grazing areas in South Africa.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Land Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:agreko:267970

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.267970

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