Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis

Kent Messer (), Todd Schmit and Harry Kaiser

No 122106, Research Bulletins from Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management

Abstract: Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated hat could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggests that producer referendum play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a Provision Point Mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.

Keywords: Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2004-12
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/122106/files/Cornell_Dyson_rb0412.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:cudarb:122106

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.122106

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