Influence of Political Campaign Contributions by American Agribusiness Firms on U.S. Farm Policy

Amilcar Serrao

No 24855, 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: This study adapts Ndayisenga and Kinsey's econometric model of the allocation of political campaign contributions by agribusiness firms. This model combines information on campaign contributions for political influence with the behavior assumption of profit maximization to test the hypotheses that agribusiness firms do not lobby against farm policies. Model results support the hypotheses and show that lobbying expenditure in output markets is statistically significant, and that political campaign contributions to the Democratic Party significantly correlate with agribusiness firms' profits. The conclusions of this study provide useful information about the intentions of agribusiness firms that participate in the political market, but the results should be carefully interpreted.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae02:24855

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.24855

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