Creating WTO Law by Stealth: GSP Conditionalities and the EC - Tariff Preferences Case

Alex Ansong

Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 2013, vol. 14, issue 2, 12

Abstract: The WTO is witnessing an increasing intrusion of its remit into areas that hitherto were the preserve of the state. This makes the legitimacy of its law creation process critical. The article engages in analyses of the conditionalities in developed countries’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes, notably those of the EU. It argues that the maintenance of conditionalities in developed countries’ GSP schemes can result in extra regulatory burdens for developing countries and can have the effect of creating WTO law by stealth. The analyses centre on the Appellate Body decision in the EC - Tariff Preferences case.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; International Development; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; Productivity Analysis; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/161438/files/ansong14-2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ecjilt:161438

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.161438

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy from Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().