 Why did the Byrd Amendment Not Fly at the WTO?Ben Harris and Stephen Devadoss Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, 2005, vol. 06, issue 2, 19 Abstract: Since its passage in 2000, the Byrd Amendment has been the focal point of ongoing disputes over the acceptable scope of antidumping laws and fair protection of domestic industry. Most countries possess antidumping laws that allow for duties to be placed on imported dumped goods. The Byrd Amendment seeks to extend such policies by mandating the redistribution of collected antidumping duties to "affected domestic producers" in the form of "offset" payments. The United States was immediately taken to the WTO by 11 countries who contend that the Byrd Amendment constitutes an unfair "double protection" of domestic industry. This article reviews the history of the dispute, negotiations between the parties, the arguments put forth by each party to the WTO, the WTO's findings and rulings, and retaliations taken by the affected countries. Further, this study shows that the effects of dumping are effectively neutralized by the antidumping duties, and that the payment of offsets introduced by the Byrd Amendment is an unnecessary double protection of U.S. domestic industry. Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ecjilt:23885 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy from Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade Contact information at EDIRC. |
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