Quotas négociables, politique de compensation et réforme de la PAC

D.-R. Harvey

Économie rurale, 1984, vol. 163

Abstract: A politically acceptable alternative to price reductions is to limit the commitment of support to a given production level, thus containing support expenditure. The market and price mechanism applied to saleable or tradeable quotas not only allows for flexibility in distribution of the quota, allocating quota to those who receive most benefit from the high support prices, but also establishes, through the market price of the quotas, the capitalised value of the market support over and above the «free market» output price. In so doing, any purchaser of quotas correctly compensates the vendor for giving up the right to produce at supported prices. In addition, the capitalisation of the support value in the quota price leaves the revenue, net of quota values, at a similar level to the free market net revenues, thus encouraging the efficient use of real ressources. A potential extension involves the support authorities progressively reducing the level of support commitment and simultaneously providing the appropriate compensation to producers by buying in quota levels.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ersfer:351496

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.351496

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