Les marchés au cadran et la formation des prix

Florence Naegelen

Économie rurale, 1985, vol. 170

Abstract: Dutch type auctions, used to sell fruits and vegetables, are special resources allocation procedures. In this article, we study the mechanism properties through the bidding theory methods. The Dutch auction is often preferred to other allocation procedures for several reasons: it's an efficient and very fast revelation mechanism, which is fair. A game theory analysis is used to study the Dutch auction prices properties. The decreasing auction is a non cooperative game which is strategically equivalent to the first priGe auction. The price formed, depending on the buyers' strategies, is a competitive price which tends to the true price when buyers become more risk averse and when competition increases.

Keywords: Demand; and; Price; Analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ersfer:351593

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.351593

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