La négociation de la qualité

François Eymard-Duvernay

Économie rurale, 1993, vol. 217

Abstract: The goal of this article is to show that neither market nor collective rules are efficient devices to improve quality of goods. In market, agents aren't committed. Sellers are likely to cheat clients out of quality. Clients don't communicate with sellers in case of problems about quality. Collective rules can commit sellers and are general references for consumers. But it is necessary to adapt rules to unexpected events and specific needs. They cannot stand in for dynamic interactions between sellers and clients. Quality results from the negotiation into networks.

Keywords: Industrial; Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ersfer:351849

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.351849

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