Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric

Vassiliki Manoussi and Anastasios Xepapadeas

No 190930, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous regions or countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a trade-off actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2014-12-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/190930/files/NL2014-101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2015)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2014)
Working Paper: Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:190930

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.190930

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().