Political Cycles: The Opposition Advantage

Pascal Gautier and Raphael Soubeyran

No 12194, Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feempr:12194

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12194

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