Political Participation and Competition in Concurrent Elections: Evidence from Italy

Federico Fabio Frattini

No 359333, FEEM Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper investigates how concurrent national and local elections affect the local political participation and competition. Leveraging a quasi-experimental framework provided by Italy’s staggered electoral timing, the paper employs a difference-in-differences design. Estimates reveal that municipalities holding concurrent elections exhibit lower levels of local participation and competition. Moreover, the concurrent election increases participation by candidates with nationally-established parties, while decreases participation with independent parties. This further translates into a higher votes share for nationally-established parties and a consequent higher probability of election. Elected mayors tend to have lower education and experience in office, while they are more likely to be from the municipality they were elected in. Further, elected mayors are able to attract more intergovernmental transfers, without substantially affecting local spending patterns.

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2025-07-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemwp:359333

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.359333

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