Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets

GianCarlo Moschini, Luisa Menapace and Daniel H. Pick

No 6891, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Archive from Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract: The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of the agricultural sector with free entry/exit. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality that partly overcomes the market failure and leads to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the (constrained) first-best level of the high-quality good. The main beneficiaries of the welfare gains are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if the production of high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.

Keywords: Public; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6891/files/wp080458.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:hebarc:6891

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6891

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Hebrew University of Jerusalem Archive from Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().