DEATH (MACHINES) AND TAXES

Jonathan Lipow and Yakir Plessner

No 7136, Discussion Papers from Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management

Abstract: In the defense policy literature, it is widely believed that there is a pronounced bias towards the procurement of a less than optimal number of excessively sophisticated weapons. In this paper, we consider the possibility that this perceived bias is the result of the timing and informational structure of defense procurement decisions, and the inter-relationship of this structure with overall fiscal policy. Specifically, this paper presents a model that suggests that tax smoothing considerations of the type first articulated in Barro (1979) could lead social welfare maximizing decision makers to choose a higher level of weapon quality than would be optimal if government revenue could be raised without resort to distortionary taxation.

Keywords: Public; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:huaedp:7136

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7136

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