Institutional Aspects of Economic Reform: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective

Oliver Williamson

No 294671, Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series from Institute for Policy Reform

Abstract: Transaction cost economics goes beyond the orthodox prescription for a reformed economy -- which emphasizes the use of macroeconomic instruments to control inflation, the removal of • price controls, currency convertibility, and the removal of trade restraints -- and urges that the institutions of economic organization play a vital role in determining the success or failure of reform. Especially important are institutions to support high powered incentives. The difference between genuine and simulated privatization are examined in this connection. Also crucial are credible commitments by the state to forestall hazards of expropriation. The • design of constitutions and of the judiciary are pertinent. Reform efforts can and have been defeated by over-managing the process. The "costs of good intentions" (of both benign and insidious kinds) need to be expressly taken into account.

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Institutional and Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 1991-09
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Working Paper: Institutional Aspects of Economic Reform: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective (1991)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iprwps:294671

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.294671

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