Politicians and Firms

Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

No 294852, Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series from Institute for Policy Reform

Abstract: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized 'facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries

Keywords: Industrial Organization; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57
Date: 1994-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/294852/files/ipr090.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iprwps:294852

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.294852

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series from Institute for Policy Reform
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().