Fixed Rules and Decision Rules: Time Consistency and Subgame Perfection

Chaim Fershtman

No 275442, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: The paper investigates the relationship between time consistency and subgame perfection. We show that despite some suggestions in the literature, the two are not equivalent. Subgame perfection is a stronger refinement. The paper also discusses the classes of .games in which time consistency and subgame perfection are equivalent.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 1988-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275442

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275442

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