Imperfect Competition Under Uncertainty

Gideon Fishelson

No 275451, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: The behavior of firms in the Cournot-Nash model is examined under uncertainty in market demand and in their production. The emerging result is that if one of the firms is strongly more risk averse than the other its output will increase but total output declines (even when the other is risk neutral). In the Stackelberg model however if the follower is risk neutral he might compensate for the decline of output by the leader.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 1988-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275451

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275451

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