Imperfectly Informative Equilibria for Signalling Games

Arthur Fishman

No 275603, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: I analyze the equilibria of signalling games in which initially uninformed players may choose to become informed from an external source at a cost. It is shown that the lower this cost, the greater the extent to which the informed player's actions reveal its private information and the more the outcome resembles the symmetric information equilibrium.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 1995-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275603

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275603

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