CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON FARM PAYMENT LIMITATIONS: POLITICAL PRESSURE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION?

Jonathan Brooks

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1997, vol. 22, issue 2, 15

Abstract: The determinants of House and Senate votes on congressional amendments to limit payments to farmers are investigated. One concern is that campaign contributions may influence politicians' votes. Lobbying activity, as attempts to distinguish ideological motivations from passive constituency pressures suffer from theoretical and empirical shortcomings. So-called ideologically based decisions may reflect the ideology of the congressman's constituents rather than independent action on the basis of exogenous beliefs, while this ideology may itself be determined by politicoeconomic factors. A simultaneous relationship between money and votes is found in the House, but not in the Senate.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlaare:30854

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30854

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