FARMERS' PREFERENCES FOR CROP CONTRACTS

Kaouthar Lajili, Peter J. Barry, Steven T. Sonka and Joseph T. Mahoney

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1997, vol. 22, issue 2, 17

Abstract: An empirical approach combining elements of principal-agent theory and transaction cost economics is used to determine farmers' preferences for contract terms in crop production. The approach is tested by asking grain farmers to rank contract choices and specify price premiums in simulated case situations. The statistical results indicate that farmers' preferences for rates of cost sharing, price premiums, and financing arrangements are significantly influenced by asset specialization and uncertainty associated with the case situations, and by selected business and personal characteristics.

Keywords: Farm; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlaare:30859

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30859

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