EXTERNALITIES FROM ROAMING LIVESTOCK: EXPLAINING THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN RANGE

Terence Centner and Ronald C. Griffin

Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1998, vol. 23, issue 01, 14

Abstract: Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.

Keywords: Livestock; Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:jlaare:31183

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.31183

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