Investigating Bargaining Power of Farmers and Processors in Iran's Dairy Market

Zeinab Shokoohi, Amir Hossein Chizari and Madhi Asgari

Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2018, vol. 51, issue 1

Abstract: The farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Dairy Farming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:joaaec:356464

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.356464

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