Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice

Rajiv Sarin and Farshid Vahid

No 267377, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics

Abstract: We use the model developed in Sarin and Vahid (1999, GEB) to explain the experiments reported in Erev and Roth (1998, AER). The model supposes that players maximize subject to their "beliefs" which are non-probabilistic and scalar-valued. They are intended to describe the payoffs the players subjectively assess they will obtain from a strategy. In an earlier paper (Sarin and Vahid (1997) we showed that the model predicted behavior in repeated coordination games remarkably well, and better than equilibrium theory or reinforcement learning models. In this paper we show that the same one-parameter model can also explain behavior in games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium better than alternative models. Hence, we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model.

Keywords: Labor and Human Capital; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/267377/files/monash-264.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/267377/files/monash-264.pdf?subformat=pdfa (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:monebs:267377

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.267377

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().