Towards a Theoretical Framework for Policy Behavioral Equations

John Beghin ()

No 259443, Department of Economics and Business - Archive from North Carolina State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A game-theoretic framework unifies the revealed preference approach to government objectives· and the policy behavioral equation methodology. Public policies are the equilibrium outcome of a cooperative game among interest groups and the policy maker. This study stresses the interdependencebetween policies and players' bargaining strength, and derives their comparative statics with respect to a changing economic environment. ·rt provides a specification of behavioral equations consistent with the underlying bargaining process. An analysis of the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in Senegal illustrates the proposed framework.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 1988-10-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ncbuar:259443

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259443

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