Prudential Practices and Financial Stability: Some Conceptual Issues

Somesh K. Mathur

No 330963, Conference papers from Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project

Abstract: The paper reviews the sources of market failure in financial institutions and markets and what can be done to alleviate them. It examines game-theoretic explanations for financial instability, in particular the role of asymmetric information in generating destabilising behaviour. In the area of remedies, the paper analyses the potential contribution of official safety nets and what can be done to minimize the associated moral hazard. In this context, it discusses the role of regulation and transparency.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Agricultural Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/330963/files/335.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:pugtwp:330963

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Conference papers from Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().