Welfare Evaluation of VERs with Fiscal Policy

Fuhmei Wang

No 330965, Conference papers from Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project

Abstract: Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) endeavor to investigate the international welfare spillovers with monopolistic competition and sticky output prices in a flexible exchange rate system. This paper applies their framework to analyze the macroeconomic effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) with fiscal policies, generating plenty of results. The particular contribution of this paper to the welfare effects of country sizes on policy lies in the cases of numerical simulations. The discussions of spillover effects, numerical simulations, and imperfect competition to export quotas as well as fiscal policies abroad fill in the gaps on the literature. Then it takes a further step on international macroeconomics.

Keywords: International Relations/Trade; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:pugtwp:330965

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