Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance

Frank Milne and David Kelsey

No 273555, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies corporate governance when a firm operates in imperfect markets. We derive firms’ decisions from utility maximisation by individuals. If those involved in decisions are also consumers the usual monopoly distortion is reduced. Corporate governance can effect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us to endogenise the objective function of the firm. If the firm cannot commit not to change its constitution, we find a Coase-like result where all market power is lost in the limit. We present a more abstract model of governance in the presence of market distortions.

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Financial Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2006-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance (2008)
Working Paper: Imperfect Competition And Corporate Governance (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:273555

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273555

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