Fair Collective Choice Rules: Their Origin and Relationship

Yukihiro Nishimura

No 273656, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2008-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:273656

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273656

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