University Funding Policies: Buildings or Citizens?

Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-AndrÃl’

No 274622, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: Governments fund public universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for student recruitment. I show that such rule can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a more efficient policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. Such funding rule should not be solely based on university’s own enrolement, but also on enrolment in competing universities.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2013-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:274622

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274622

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