DISCRIMINATORY PRICING UNDER A U.S. PRODUCER BOARD

Philip L. Paarlber and Forrest D. Holland

No 276746, Staff Reports from United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

Abstract: This study simulates the consequences of replacing the competitive market for wheat and feed grains in the United States with a producer marketing board daich practices price discrimination. A U.S. producer board for wheat and feed ;rains would increase prices in the nonfeed and export markets by reducing sales in those markets. Further, board carry-out stocks would rise, while prices in lonboard markets would fall to the loan rate. U.S. growers would receive wind- fall rents, most of which would be income transfers from U.S. consumers. The Rifted States would receive a monopoly rent from foreign consumers. The board policy would support foreign producers through windfall gains. Finally, the board's operation would reduce the variability in grain prices.

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries; Demand and Price Analysis; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 1982-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/276746/files/ers-report-057.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uerssr:276746

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.276746

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Reports from United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().