Asymmetric Information in the Market for Yield and Revenue Insurance Products

Shiva S. Makki and Agapi Somwaru

No 33587, Technical Bulletins from United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

Abstract: This report analyzes farmers' choice of crop insurance contracts and tests for the presence of asymmetric information in the market for multiple yield and revenue insurance products. Farmers' risk characteristics, their level of income, and the cost of insurance significantly affect their choices of yield and revenue insurance products as well as their selections of alternative coverage levels. Empirical analysis indicates that, in the presence of asymmetric information, high-risk farmers are more likely to select revenue insurance contracts and higher coverage levels. The results also indicate that premium rates do not accurately reflect the likelihood of losses, implying asymmetrical information in the crop insurance market.

Keywords: Risk; and; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uerstb:33587

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.33587

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