POWER RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PRIORI VOTING POWER USING THE THEORY OF SIMPLE GAMES

D. Leech

No 268776, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Keywords: Financial Economics; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56
Date: 1997-12-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:268776

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268776

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