Corporate Governance and the Public Interest

J. Robert Branston, Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden

No 269400, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: A theory of the firm based on strategic decision-making highlights governance as a central issue. Preferences vary over strategy but not all interests are currently being represented, resulting in a failure to govern in the public interest. As solutions, we consider the design of company law and also more immediate ways forward, focusing on regulation and democratically controlled public agencies, but stressing the fundamental significance of active, effective citizens. Throughout, the arguments are illustrated using examples from various countries and industries, including education, information technology, football and public utilities in Europe and the US.

Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2001-12-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269400

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269400

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