A New Analysis of A Priori Voting Power in the IMF: Recent Quota Reforms Give Little Cause for Celebration

Dennis Leech and Robert Leech

No 270548, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: The weighted voting system used by the International Monetary Fund creates problems of democratic legitimacy since each member's influence or voting power is not in general equal to its voting weight. Using voting power analysis to analyse both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board, we show that it tends to enhance the power of the United States at the expense of all other members. We investigate the constituency system as a form of representative democracy, idealizing it as a compound voting body, and find that it gives disproportionately large power to some smaller European countries, particularly Belgium and Netherlands. We also find that many countries are effectively disenfranchised. Separate analyses are done for 2006 and 2012, before and after recent reforms, which have been billed as being radical, enhancing the voice of the poor and emerging markets, but the effects are disappointingly small.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2012-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:270548

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270548

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