Job Protection, Housing Market Regulation and the Youth

Antoine Bonleu (), Bruno Decreuse and Tanguy van Ypersele

No 1636, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: Young Europeans experience high unemployment rates, job instability and late emancipation. Meanwhile they do not support reforms weakening protection on long-term contracts. In this paper, we suggest a possible rationale for such reform distaste. When the rental market is very regulated, landlords screen applicants with regard to their ability to pay the rent. Protecting regular jobs offers a second-best technology to sort workers, thereby increasing the rental market size. We provide a model where non-employed workers demand protected jobs despite unemployment and the share of short-term jobs increase, whereas rents, wages and the individual risk of dismissal are unaffected.

Keywords: labor market dualism; rent default; screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K31 R2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: Job protection, housing market regulation, and the youth (2019)
Working Paper: Job Protection, Housing Market Regulation and the Youth (2019)
Working Paper: Job Protection, Housing Market Regulation and the Youth (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1636

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