Strategic Communication of Economic Opportunities with Externalities

Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan and Mathieu Faure
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Mohamed Belhaj: Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France
Frédéric Deroïan: Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France
Mathieu Faure: Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France

No 2605, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: A subset of economic agents in a society is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete to exploit the opportunity. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity when the exploitation of the opportunity by the winner generates externalities to other agents. We characterize the equilibria of the communication game and identify conditions under which more externalities generate more communication.

Keywords: Opportunity; Strategic Communication; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-09
Note: Working paper AMSE 2026-05
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