Endogenous Timing in a Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2016, vol. 3, issue 12, 758-763

Abstract: This paper considers mixed duopoly games where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete in price. The public firm aims to maximize the un-weighted sum of consumer surplus and its own profit. The paper examines a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, an effect of eliminating the foreign firm and an endogenous role in price-setting mixed duopoly by adopting the observable delay game. Consequently, the paper shows that the unique equilibrium of price-setting international mixed competition is quite different from that of quantity-setting international mixed competition.

Keywords: price competition; Endogenous timing; mixed market; Foreign private firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:air:journl:v:3:y:2016:i:12:p:758

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17500601

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