Lifetime Employment and a Sequential Choice in a Mixed Duopoly Market with a Joint-Stock Firm

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2016, vol. 3, issue 5, 283-295

Abstract: This paper examines a three-stage game model in which a joint-stock private firm and a state-owned public firm can sequentially offer lifetime employment before competing in quantities. The game runs as follows. First, the joint-stock private firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Second, the state-owned public firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Third, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously and independently. The paper demonstrates that there is an equilibrium solution where only the joint-stock private firm offers lifetime employment.

Keywords: mixed duopoly; three-stage game; state-owned firm; Joint-stock firm; lifetime employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:air:journl:v:3:y:2016:i:5:p:283

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17423279

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