Lifetime Employment and Mixed Cournot Duopoly with State-Owned and Joint-Stock Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2018, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-9

Abstract: This paper examines a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a joint-stock firm. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm can simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. In the second stage, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its actual output. The paper shows that there are two equilibrium solutions in the model.

Keywords: Joint-stock firm; lifetime employment; mixed duopoly; state-owned firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ijmae.com/article_114720_c6e8971e9ead1c12fb8b306205c0334b.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:air:journl:v:5:y:2018:i:1:p:1

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17540618

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics from International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Behzad Hassannezhad Kashani ().