The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2020, vol. 7, issue 3, 167-172

Abstract: This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager. In the second stage, the firms that hired managers select incentive parameters for them. In the third stage, firms compete in Cournot fashion. The paper presents the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model.

Keywords: Cournot model; managerial delegation; mixed duopoly; labor-managed firm; state-owned firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:air:journl:v:7:y:2020:i:3:p:167

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17218234

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